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The Intellectual Origins of Torts
in America*
G. Edward Whitet
The emergence of Torts as an independent branch of law came
strikingly late in American legal history. Although Blackstone and
his contemporaries, in their 18th-century efforts to classify law, iden-
tified a residual category of noncriminal wrongs not arising out of
contract,' Torts was not considered a discrete branch of law until
the late 19th century. The first American treatise on Torts appeared
in 1859 -;2 Torts was first taught as a separate law school subject in
1870; 3 the first Torts casebook was published in 1874.4
A standard explanation for the emergence of an independent iden-
tity for Torts late in the 19th century is the affinity of Tort doctrines,
especially negligence, to the problems produced by industrialization. 5
I argue, in what follows, that the process by which Torts emerged
as a discrete branch of law was more complex and less dictated by
the demands of industrial enterprise than the standard account sug-
gests. Changes associated with industrial enterprise did provide many
more cases involving strangers. And those cases did play a part in the
emergence of Torts as an independent branch of law. But those
cases alone were not sufficient. Also necessary was a reorientation
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forthcoming book, The Intellectual Foundations of Torts. Thomas F. Bergin, Robert
Brugger, Stephen Presser, and Debra Willen read preliminary drafts of this article and
made helpful critical suggestions. An earlier version of this article was presented to the
Legal Theory Workshop at Yale Law School. The participants in that Workshop should
not be made responsible for the article's content, but I profited from their comments.
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. Blackstone's Commentaries had separate chapters on trespass and nuisance and
referred to torts as "all actions for trespasses, nuisances, defamatory words, and the like."
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117. The general classification system of Blackstone's
Commentaries is discussed in note 13 infra.
2. I F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS iii-iv (Boston 1859). See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
or AMERICAN LAW 409 (1973).
3. See THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 29 (1918).
4. J. AMsS, SELEcr CASES ON TORTS (1874). See Rothenberg, Book Review, 23 U.C.L.A.
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5. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 262, 409; M. HoRWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-99 (1977); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 368, 377-79, 382 (1951). See also Roberts, Negligence: Black-
stone to Shaw to 7 An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 204-05,
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of thinking about classifications of law itself. The emergence of Torts
owed as much to changes in jurisprudential thought as to the spread
of industrial machines.
In brief, this article maintains that the interaction of three trends
in the late 19th century fostered the development of Torts as a separate
legal subject. The first trend was an impulse toward "conceptualiza-
tion" among American intellectuals, including legal scholars. A mani-
festation of the advent of "Victorian" culture in America, the impulse
sought universal principles in academic fields of study. It stressed
"scientific" methodologies and substituted secular theories for religious
dogma. The second trend was the collapse of the system of common
law writ pleading, whose jurisprudential scaffolding, once functionally
effective, became too random and arbitrary to satisfy those interested
in achieving regularity and expediency in legal proceedings. 6 A third
trend was the gradual change of the standard tort case from one
involving persons in closely defined relations with each other to one
involving strangers. As judges and academics sought to extract a set
of universal principles from this new prototypical tort situation, the
notion of a general, but severely limited, theory of civil obligation
emerged. That notion, slow to be articulated, influenced the trans-
formation of the older tort of neglect into the modern tort of negli-
gence, with its generalized principles and its fault prerequisite for
liability. With the convergence of these trends, Torts came to be con-
ceived as a discrete legal subject in treatises, casebooks, and law school
curricula.7
6. Horwitz argues that the promotion of these values was a significant concern of
mid-19th-century judges and jurists. See M. HoRwrz, supra note 5, at 258-66.
7. The late emergence of Torts as a separate branch of law cannot be explained
merely by reference to changes in the pattern of American legal education. It is true
that the generalized categories of modern American private law-Property, Contracts,
Torts, etc.-were not universally employed in the early 19th century. See THE CEN-
TENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 24, 73-75 (1918); A. REED, TRAINING FOR
THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 139, 146 (1921). Law school courses in what would
now be considered subtopics of a general field-Bills and Notes, Bailments, Sales, Bank-
ruptcy-were more common. See, e.g., id. at 458. But both Litchfield and Harvard Law
Schools, the primary centers of formal legal education in the early 19th century, listed
courses in Contracts and Property. Id. at 454. No courses in Torts were offered, however,
and almost no attention was given to individual actions in tort, such as assault, battery,
defamation, deceit, or false imprisonment. (Roger Baldwin's lecture notes at Litchfield
Law School indicate, however, that brief coverage was given to torts. See Stevens, Two
Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403, 432
n.31 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). Moreover, the great treatise writers of the early
19th century, James Kent and Joseph Story, did not perceive Torts as a discrete legal
subject. See J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (New York 1826-1830); J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston 1834); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston 1833); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (Boston 1836); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (Boston
1838); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (Boston 1839); J. STORY, COM-
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Events as well as ideas played a part in creating the climate of in-
tellectual legal opinion that spawned Torts as an independent category
of law. But this article focuses on events only as they were used by
intellectuals in the legal profession as raw material for the formula-
tion of legal doctrine and theory. My concern is to detail the role of
designated lawyer intellectuals, who can be called glossators, in in-
fluencing the development of legal doctrine in America. Glossators
-who, after 1870, were primarily academicians-fulfill their profes-
sional roles, in important part, through their efforts to derive and
articulate theoretical justifications for the working rules of law that
have current acceptance. In this "glossing" process, these intellectuals
significantly affect the content of legal doctrines and rules and conse-
quently affect the changing state of law in America.8
I. The Conceptualist Impulse in Victorian America
Between 1800 and 1850 the attraction of many Americans to the
values of individual freedom, equality, and occupational mobility
tended to call into question an 18th-century conception of society
as an ordered community with designated social roles and relatively
limited mobility. In the 19th century, alongside a relatively static,
hierarchical vision of man's place in society, there emerged a dynamic,
atomistic vision that emphasized the limitless possibilities for indi-
vidual mobility, creativity, and achievement.9 For a time these visions
were apparently not perceived as contradictory. Leading literary fig-
ures could espouse both individual freedom and the ideal of com-
munal life.'10 National politicians could simultaneously portray them-
selves as guardians of a simpler, more orderly republican society and
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (Cambridge, Mass. 1832); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Boston 1843); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF PARTNERSHIP (Boston 1841); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY
NOTES (Boston 1845). For a discussion of Story's Commentaries, see G. DUNNE, JUSTICE
JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 310-15 (1970).
8. Although the American intellectuals discussed in this article are generally mem-
bers of academic and professional elites, their elite professional status is not intended
to be unduly emphasized. But historically certain groups of persons have tended to
serve as articulators of values and goals for the legal profession, and those groups have
normally possessed elite status. Whether the goals and values of those groups were
shared by other Americans of the late 19th century is an inquiry that takes one well
beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes a degree of elite intellectual
influence in the late-19th-century legal profession is assumed.
9. This generalization has received widespread support in the historical literature.
See, e.g., R. WELTER, THE MIND OF AMERICA, 1820-1860, at 117-22, 141-56 (1975) (citing
sources).
10. See A. KAUL, THE AMERICAN VISION (1963) (tracing this theme in writings of
Cooper, Hawthorne, Melville, and Mark Twain).
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as apostles of democratic progress."1 Even theologians, such as the in-
fluential Unitarian spokesman William Ellery Channing, could assert
that the universe was ordered by God's laws and yet applaud "'ques-
tion[ing] [of] the infinite, the unsearchable, with an audacious self
reliance.' "12
Perhaps the most striking indication that early 19th-century legal
scholars were similarly affected by these cultural trends was their
possession of both synthetic and atomistic visions of law. Blackstone,
in his 18th-century synthetic view, had seen the "Law of England" as
a unified entity, capable of being classified into distinguishable but
interdependent parts.13 By the early 19th century, in Kent's and Story's
treatises, law was primarily represented as the sum of its parts (the
"law" of bailments, the "law" of agency, etc.), but was still perceived
as capable of presentation in the form of a grand synthesis. Nathan
Dane's widely used Abridgment,14 which first appeared in 1823, was
also an attempt at synthesis, but Dane's organization suggested that
American law was a series of diverse interpretations of individual
actions that possessed little unity or coherence. And by the 1850s
leading treatise writers such as Theophilus Parsons and Emory Wash-
burn stressed encyclopedic coverage more than theoretical synthesis.'3
Although a sense that American law was dissonant, diverse, and
even chaotic developed in early 19th-century legal scholarship, this
perception went hand in hand with a belief that American society
was still to some extent a communal entity, bound together by shared
values. A major source of these shared communal values was religious
dogma.', Parsons's treatise on contracts, for example, distinguished
between "the law of God" and "human law."' 7 Parsons argued, build-
ing on this distinction, that human laws, with which his treatise was
11. Andrew Jackson personified these tendencies. See M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PER-
SUASION (1957); J. WARD, ANDREW JACKSON, SYMBOL FOR AN AGE (1955).
12. J. HIGHAM, FROM BOUNDLESSNESS TO CONSOLIDATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER-
ICAN CULTURE, 1848-1860, at 6 (William L. Clements Library 1969).
13. Blackstone's Commentaries had divided "the Laws of England" into "the rights
of persons" (e.g., sovereign immunities, master-servant, domestic relations), "the rights
of things" (real and personal property), "private wrongs" (e.g., trespass, nuisance, equitable
remedies, and civil procedure), and "public wrongs" (criminal law and procedure). This
fourfold division constituted the four volumes of his commentaries.
14. N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAw (Boston 1823-
1829).
15. See, e.g., T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Boston 1853-1855); E. WASHBURN, A
TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (Boston 1860-1862). Washburn's treatise
was written between 1856 and 1860. See THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL 356 (1918).
16. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1725-27 (1976).
17. 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 15, at 265.
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concerned, could not entirely sanction "craft and cunning"; but this
fact should not be taken to mean that "whatever human law does
not prohibit, [one] has a right to do; for that only is right which
violates no law, and there is another law beside human law."' 8
If the simultaneous possession of synthetic and atomistic visions of
society was a defining characteristic of early 19th-century American
culture, and if significant manifestations of these two visions were
the binding force of religious dogma and a growing awareness of the
value of individual autonomy, a significant change in the intellectual
history of America took place in the middle of the 19th century. For
after 1850 the role of religion as a unifying force among American
intellectuals was considerably diminished, and the sense that American
civilization offered endless possibilities for individual growth and
progress was sharply qualified. With these developments a new phase
in the history of ideas in America emerged, best signified by the term
"Victorian."
"Victorian" refers to a cultural and intellectual ethos that had orig-
inated in England during the middle years of Queen Victoria's reign. 19
The ethos emerged from tensions associated with the realization that
material "progress" in an industrializing, urbanizing society had dis-
integrative capacities.20 American Victorians discovered that sudden
rises in income levels, massive industrial development, and marked
urbanization tended to undermine traditional sources of stability, es-
pecially religious dogmas, that complemented a homogeneous, village-
oriented, preindustrial society. The theological explanations of the
universe that were widely shared by early 19th-century intellectuals
had assumed an essentially static view of human nature and social
organization; such explanations appeared suddenly irrelevant to the
rapidly changing cast of American civilization after the Civil War.
Over and over again post-Civil War scholars stressed their interest
in deriving secular and scientific theories that would promote order
and unity. Henry Adams explained his "instinctive belief" in the
theory of evolution as being based on a need for a "substitute for
religion," a "working system for the universe," and a means of "en-
forc[ing] unity and uniformity. '2 1 The novelist Hamlin Garland,
reading Spencer in the 1880s, found that "'the universe took on order
18. Id.
19. See W. HOUGHTON, THE VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND, 1830-1870 (1957).
20. See Brown, Modernization: A Victorian Climax, 27 Am. Q. 533 (1975); Meyer,
American Intellectuals and the Victorian Crisis of Faith, id. at 585.
21. H. ADAMs, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 225-26 (1931). For a collection of
essays on the influence of evolution in America, see EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT IN AMERICA
(S. Persons ed. 1950).
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and harmony.' ",22 The architect Louis Sullivan felt that "Spencer's
definition implying a progression . . . to a highly organized complex,
seemed to fit" Sullivan's own experience.23 Some scholars, such as
the philosopher John Fiske, even believed that secularly based syste-
matic thinking could be reconciled with a religious faith. The au-
thority of religious principles, Fiske wrote in 1875, was no longer
derived "from the arbitrary command of a mythologic quasi-human
Ruler," but from "the innermost necessities of [the] process of evo-
lution."24
In general, post-Civil War intellectuals were interested in restoring
the sense of order and unity that had characterized 18th-century
thought, but they rejected efforts to derive order and unity from
"mythologic" religious principles. A particular interest of intellectuals
in the quarter century after the war was conceptualization-the trans-
formation of data into theories of universal applicability. Their source
of unity was to be methodological: the "scientific" ordering of knowl-
edge.23 As the sociologist Lester Ward put it, "[T]he origination and
distribution of knowledge [could] no longer be left to chance and
nature," but were "to be systematized and erected unto true arts."' 20
The two legal scholars most immediately responsive to this concep-
tualist impulse were Nicholas St. John Green and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., who, with Fiske, the philosophers William James and
Chauncey Wright, and others, were members of the celebrated Meta-
physical Club, a meeting ground of Cambridge intellectuals between
1870 and 1874.27 Green, a practicing lawyer, taught Torts and Crim-
inal Law at Harvard and Boston University Law Schools in the 1870s
and wrote several essays in the American Law Review, of which
22. Cowley, Naturalism in American Literature, in EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT IN AMERICA,
supra note 21, at 300, 304.
23. L. SULLIVAN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 255 (1934).
24. 2 J. FISKE, OUTLINES OF COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 468 (1875).
25. Other recent scholarship has perceived a similar unity in the pattern of reasoning
in post-Civil War treatises and judicial decisions. The pattern has principally been
characterized by the term formalism. See, e.g., Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism,
19 Am. J. LEG. HIsT. 251, 255-57, 261-62 (1975); Kennedy, supra note 16, at 1728-31
(using the term "Classical individualism"); Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Move-
ment upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV.
513, 514-16, 560-66 (1974). But see Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A
Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975
WIS. L. REV. 1 (criticizing Nelson for oversimplifying changes in styles of judicial
reasoning).
26. 2 L. WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY 539 (1883). Ward had begun work on Dynamic
Sociology in 1869. See R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 69 (1944).
27. For an analysis of the philosophical contributions of another member of the Club,
Charles Peirce, see Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123 (1975).
On the Metaphysical Club, see Wiener, Peirces Metaphysical Club and the Genesis of
Pragmatism, 7 J. HIsT. IDEAS 218 (1946).
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Holmes was an editor, between 1869 and 1876. When he died in
1876, Green had a treatise on Torts in preparation.
Green's approach to legal scholarship, which Holmes called phil-
osophical,28 was characteristically conceptualist. Green refused to ac-
cept legal dogmas on faith, being interested in their effectiveness as
working analytical guidelines.29 The classification of legal subjects
and the derivation of general principles of law, efforts that Green
identified with philosophically oriented scholarship, 30 were in his
judgment useless undertakings unless a given classification or principle
had a useful purpose. Purposive organization of a legal subject could
be achieved, Green maintained, by understanding the subject's history,
as with the law of slander and libel,31 or by understanding the prac-
tical considerations on which it was founded, as with the doctrine
of vicarious liability.32
Thus, while Green expressed an interest in treating the law as a
science and analyzing its developments with something akin to mathe-
matical precision, 33 he conceded that absolute lines could not be drawn
because change was constant and "[a]ll things in nature . .. shade
into each other by imperceptible degrees." 34 Paradoxically, an ac-
ceptance of the inevitability of change provided Green with some
solace. If one recognized that "[t]he latest decided cases upon [a] sub-
ject make the law," Green believed, one could try to "settle more
definitely" the analytical rationales for those cases and "to see what,
and how many, of such reasons apply, and with what force, to ...
new cases." 30 Through these techniques one derived general principles
that had some operative meaning in practice.
Green's conceptualism, like that of other American Victorian in-
28. See [Holmes], Book Review, 5 Am. L. REv. 340, 341 (1871). See also Frank, A
Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal Pragmatism, 9
RUTCErS L. REV. 425, 434 (1954).
29. In a discussion of proximate causation, Green called the phrase "natural and
proximate consequence" a "stereotyped [form] for gliding over a difficulty without ex-
plaining it." N. GREEN, Torts under the French Law, in ESSAYS AND NorEs ON THE LAW
oF TORT AND CRIME 71, 82 (1933) [book hereinafter cited as EssAYs]. The Essays are reprints
of notes and unsigned articles and book reviews that Green published in the American
Law Review, in the eighth edition of Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Law of Agency,
which Green edited, and in two volumes of criminal law cases entitled Criminal Law
Reports. All the material in the Essays was written between 1869 and 1876. 1d. at v.
30. N. GRrXN, Slander and Libel, in EssAYs, supra note 29, at 49, 69-70.
31. Id. at 53.
32. N. GREEN, The Liability of a Principal to Third Persons for the Torts of his
Agents and Servants, in ESSAYS, supra note 29, at 127, 127.
33. N. GREEN, Proximate and Remote Cause, in EssAYs, supra note 29, at 1, 16.
34. N. GREEN, Insanity in Criminal Law, in ESSAYS, supra note 29, at 161, 166.
35. N. GREEN, supra note 30, at 70.
36. N. GREEN, The Liability of a Master to his Servants, in EssAYs, supra note 29, at
131, 137.
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tellectuals, was thus an effort to derive certainty in the face of con-
tinual change. Certainty was achieved not by appeal to received dogma
but by a scientific reorientation of techniques of legal analysis. Green
was as interested in "perfect[ing] the law as a science" 37 as his con-
ceptualist contemporaries in sociology, economics, or philosophy were
in perfecting their disciplines. 38 Through these techniques new philo-
sophical classifications of law were made possible.
The strong parallels between Green's approach and that of Holmes
in the 1870s suggest a degTee of mutual influence.3 9 Green's interest
in the historical origins of legal doctrines, his conviction that rules
and principles derived their primary meaning from the circumstances
in which they were used, and his fascination with systems of legal
classification were mirrored in Holmes's early scholarship. 40 Both men
saw themselves as expounders of the law-glossators-whose interest
was in treating legal subjects philosophically from the perspective
of scientific insight."1 But despite the increasing acceptance of con-
ceptualist methodologies in American intellectual life after the Civil
War, Green, and especially Holmes, might not have been able to apply
those methodologies so readily to law had not the principal classifica-
tion device of 19th-century jurisprudence, the system of writ pleading,
collapsed, leaving a void that was ultimately to be filled by the theories
of conceptualists.
II. The Collapse of the Writ System
For the first half of the 19th century "torts" was not an autonomous
branch of law at all but merely, as Holmes noted in 1871, a collection
of unrelated writs. 2 Lawyers knew how to sue in tort, but they ap-
parently had little interest in a theory of torts. During the early 19th
century, however, the writ system became increasingly haphazard
as a classification device, in part because of the growing diversity
of American law and the tendency of courts to create exceptions to
the system's rigorous requirements, and in part, one suspects, because
37. N. GREEN, supra note 33, at 9.
38. The interdisciplinary character of conceptualism is discussed in M. WHITE, SOCIAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949).
39. The impact of Green on Holmes is discussed in Frank, supra note 28, at 434-44.
Frank argues that "in several notable respects" Green was "Holmes' precursor." Id. at 442.
40. See generally M. HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER W'VENDELL HOLMEs: THE PROVING YEARS
(1963); M. WHITE, supra note 38, at 71-75. For a discussion of Green's interest in history,
see Frank, supra note 28, at 439-40.
41. Cf. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 531-32 (discussing Langdell's belief that law
is a science).
42. [Holmes], supra note 28, at 341.
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of the absence of any powerful pressure for conceptual unity in Amer-
ican jurisprudence. By the 1850s, the haphazardness of the writ system
was a source of irritation to those working with it in the legal pro-
fession, and alternatives to writ classifications came to be considered.
The nature of those alternatives was influenced by the conceptualist
tendencies of contemporaneous legal thought.
The conventional explanation of the demise of the writ system is
that in the early years of the century dissatisfaction arose with the
system of pleading, which was founded on enforced conformity to
arcane technicalities. 43 Dissatisfaction, according to this explanation,
led to the formation of law-revision commissions in states such as New
York and Massachusetts. These commissions were charged with making
the common law more intelligible to laymen. At the same time a
movement for codification of American laws emerged, which in its
headiest versions advocated total replacement of the common law
with an American civil code. Although the codification movement ul-
timately failed, its impetus combined with revisionist impulses to pro-
duce a reform of civil procedure. The first manifestation of reform
came in the New York Code of Procedure, adopted in 1848, which
abolished the forms of action on which the writ system was based.
Other states quickly followed New York's example, with 11 states
abolishing the writ system by 1856 and 23 by the 1870s. 44
Thus related, the story has a nice historical momentum, with the
pent-up demands of the Jacksonians finding voice in the .1840s through
the genius of David Dudley Field, author of the 1848 New York Code.45
Unfortunately, not enough scrutiny of the writ system has taken place
to justify the conventional explanation. The scrutiny that has taken
place, in fact, reveals a more complex series of developments. A study
of Massachusetts pleading in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 40
for example, has shown that the writ system was not suddenly aban-
doned in that state, but was gradually and irregularly modified over
a 70-year period. Although fraught with technicalities, the Massachu-
setts system of pleading was not universally rigid: amended pleas were
permitted,47 and multiple actions were common.48 Thus when Massa-
43. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 340-46; R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 52-53 (1952); A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF
JACKSON 329-33 (1945).
44. See R. MILLAR, supra note 43, at 54-55.
45. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 340-43, 351-53; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 43,
at 330-33.
46. Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts 1760-1830:
Adjudication as a Prelude to Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1973).
47. Id. at 112-15.
48. Id. at 119.
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chusetts eventually abolished writ pleading in 1851, that "reform"
was not a major modification of existing practice.
Accompanying the overly dramatic account of the writ system's de-
mise has been an overestimation of the amount of dissatisfaction with
the system, especially among those who were most significantly af-
fected by it. The writ system served an important jurisprudential
function in the early 19th century, that of a surrogate for doctrinal
classification. The rigor of the writs, as Green pointed out, tended
to make procedural requirements the equivalent of doctrinal cate-
gories. "Whatever may be said of [the science of special pleading] as
a practical method of meting out justice between private litigants,"
Green wrote in 1871, "it is certain that the lawyer who was master
of it stood upon an eminence which gave him a clearer view of the
position of his case, in its relation both to law and the surrounding
facts, than there is any other means of obtaining.... Indeed, a knowl-
edge of criminal pleading is a knowledge of criminal law."'4 9 One
could also master "tort" doctrine by mastering the technicalities of
pleading, since, in the writs of trespass and case, the elements of proof
that gained one access to a court were often the same elements by
which one recovered. Problems of causation were solved by the writ
system's requirements; and affirmative defenses such as justification
or contributory fault were not usually allowed. A plaintiff took pains
to show how his injury resulted, either "directly" (trespass) or "in-
directly" (case), from a defendant's act. If he were able to establish
a chain of direct or indirect causation, and used the proper writ,
his chances for recovery were good.50 Knowing the procedure for suing
in trespass or case, then, was the equivalent of knowing the doctrinal
elements of those actions.
It is difficult, at least from a 20th-century perspective, to identify
the sources of the widespread dissatisfaction conventionally attributed
to this system. Few trained lawyers would likely have opposed it, since
once mastered it proved a handy digest of the common law.5' Neo-
phyte lawyers or nonlawyers might fall victim to its technicalities, but
if customs prevailing in early 19th-century Massachusetts were followed
elsewhere, rigid adherence to the formalities of pleading was not uni-
versally required, and leave to amend an ill-considered plea was regu-
larly obtained.52
49. N. GREEN, Some Results of Reform in Indictments, in EssAys, supra note 29, at
151, 151.
50. For a description of writ pleading in Massachusetts, see Nelson, supra note 46,
at 98-116.
51. Dane's Abridgment was organized around existing forms of action. N. DANE, supra
note 14.
52. See Nelson, supra note 46, at 112-16.
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Yet the fact remains that the writ system was widely abolished in
the 1850s with remarkably little opposition. In light of the strong
lawyer resistance to the codification that took place in the mid-19th
century53 the abolition of technical pleading might seem a little sur-
prising, since the common law, so vigorously defended by lawyers,
derived its substantive doctrines largely from its pleading require-
ments. But if one conjectures that the change came from within-that
the system was discarded by those who had profited most from it-
the collapse of the writ system becomes more understandable. If one
recalls that the writ system functioned as a device for classifying sub-
stantive doctrine, one might hypothesize that writ pleading lost support
when it ceased to function successfully in that capacity. Its failure
to perform as a means of doctrinal organization can be traced to the
tendencies toward diversity and dissonance that marked early 19th-
century jurisprudence. As the ambit of legal concerns widened and
diversified, different localities adopted their own rules of special
pleading. In another age the Balkanization of pleading rules might
have been intellectually offensive; in the America of the early 19th
century, however, jurisprudential order was not universally prized. By
the 1850s, however, the haphazardness of the writ system and its
structural emphasis-on discrete elements rather than on universals-
came to be regarded as analytically unsatisfactory.
With each relaxation of the technicalities of pleading there was a
loss of certainty and predictability about substantive legal rules; if the
writ system was only indifferently adhered to during the early 19th
century, its value as a classification device was undermined. David
Dudley Field, for example, called writ pleading " 'clumsily devised,' "
and "'inconvenient in practice.' "5 In addition, the writ system's
emphasis on arcane particulars ran counter to a growing scholarly
interest in deriving universal principles. "Like other sciences," a com-
mentator noted in 1851, the law was "supposed to be pervaded by
general rules .... [and] to have first or fundamental principles, never
modified."' 5 Some years later, Holmes, in discussing a recently enacted
state code of procedure, linked this search for scientific universals to a
realization of the failings of the writ system:
If those forms had been based upon a comprehensive survey of
the field of rights and duties, so that they embodied in a practical
shape a classification of the law, with a form of action to cor-
53. See M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERs IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at
83-88 (1976); P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 251-54 (1965).
54. P. MILLER, supra note 53, at 259.
55. Id. at 161.
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respond to every substantial duty, the question would be other
than it is. But [the writs] are in fact so arbitrary in character, and
owe their origin to such purely historical causes, that nothing
keeps them but our respect for the sources of our jurisprudence.66
This same dissatisfaction with the particularistic approach of the
writs, and a comparable inclination to seek universal guiding prin-
ciples in the law, motivated Francis Hilliard to write the first gen-
eralized treatment of Torts in America. "By a singular process of in-
version," Hilliard wrote in commenting on previous treatments of
tort actions, "remedies [procedural requirements] have been substitut-
ed for wrongs [substantive elements of an action]."' 7 "It is difficult
to understand," Hilliard maintained,
how so obviously unphilosophical a practice became established.
..To consider wrongs as merely incidental to remedies; to in-
quire for what injuries a particular action may be brought, in-
stead of explaining the injuries themselves, and then asking what
actions may be brought for their redress, seems to me to reverse
the natural order of things .... 58
For Hilliard, emphasis on the writs gave "a false view of the law, as
a system of forms rather than principles; [it] elevate[d] the positive
and conventional above the absolute and permanent." 50 Hilliard's ap-
proach to Torts sought to show that the subject "involve[d] principles
of great comprehensiveness, not modified or colored by diverse forms
of action."60 In the developing tradition of 19th-century scientific
methodology, he proceeded from universals to particulars.
In sum, one can associate the demise of the writ system with the
emergence of conceptualism in intellectual thought. By the 1850s the
haphazardness of the writ system had become a source of irritation
to those working with it in the legal profession, and a search had be-
gun for alternatives to writ classifications."' In the effort by glossators
to replace the writs with generalized substantive legal principles and
doctrines, the idea of treating Torts as an independent legal subject
came into being. The origins of Torts, then, can be traced to the
56. [Holmes], Book Review, 5 Am. L. REv. 359 (1871) (reviewing THE CODE OF PRO-
CEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AS AMENDED TO 1870 (10th ed. J. Townshend 1870)).
57. 1 F. HILLIARD, supra note 2, at v (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at vi-vii.
59. Id. at vii.
60. Id. at viii (emphasis in original).
61. Another factor possibly prompting mid-19th-century American lawyers to reassess
the worth of the writ system was a growing consciousness of the image of their profession.
See M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 53, at 136-90.
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interaction, in post-Civil War America, of a conceptualist jurispru-
dence with a deteriorating system of pleading and procedure. Because
of this interaction recognition of an independent branch of tort law
was, at least, possible. Still wanting was the development of theoretical
principles by which Torts could identify itself.
III. A Theory for Torts: The Emergence of Negligence
Francis Hilliard conceded in his 1859 preface that although he had
"entire confidence in the idea" of treating Torts as a separate subject,
he had "much diffidence as to the execution. ' 62 His treatise, in fact,
was not entirely successful in distinguishing Torts from other legal
categories. Included in his discussion of torts were chapters on crimes
and property and, in his discussion of slander, treatments of evidence
and damages. Hilliard's effort was representative of early attempts
to organize the subject matter of Torts. In James Barr Ames's case-
book, which appeared in 1874, coverage was limited to intentional
torts and trespass.63 It was classifications like these that caused Holmes,
reviewing Charles Addison's treatise on Torts in the American Law
Review in 1871, to assert that "Torts is not a proper subject for a
law book."0 4 He found an absence of a "cohesion or legal relationship"
between the variously treated topics. Trespass, for example, was far
closer to "possession enforced by real actions" than to assault and bat-
tery; yet the two were paired as "torts."' 5 Holmes "long[ed] for the
day when we may see these subjects treated by a writer capable of
dealing with them philosophically." 6 By philosophically Holmes
meant, as Hilliard and Green had, with sufficient consciousness of
scientifically derived universal principles.
It was at this point-the 1870s-that an academic search for over-
riding theoretical principles in Torts seems to have begun in earnest. 67
62. 1 F. HILLIARD, supra note 2, at x (emphasis in original).
63. J. Arsa, supra note 4.
64. [Holmes], supra note 28, at 341.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In 1870, Green, in his preface to Charles G. Addison's Law of Torts, wrote that
Torts was "the law of those rights which avail against all persons generally, or against
all mankind." Green noted that Torts was "usually treated of under the titles of the
various forms of action which lie for the infringement of such rights." He felt that
such a treatment tended "to confuse these fundamental principles which should be
kept distinct in the mind of the student." Green, Preface to C. ADDISON, LAW OF TORTS
at iii (abr. 1870). Holmes reviewed the book in the American Law Review. See note 28
supra. Others working on the reorientation of Torts at the same time were Melville
Bigelow, Charles Doe, and Thomas Cooley. See M. HowE, supra note 40, at 83-84, 139.
Although this article does not focus on the professionalization of the field of law in
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Two years after Holmes's assertion that Torts was an unfit subject
for a treatise, he attempted to formulate a theory of Torts; in passing,
he noted that "there is no fault to be found with the contents of
text-books on this subject."68 The study of Torts had become promis-
ing for Holmes because he had been able to discover that "an enumera-
tion of the actions which have been successful, and of those which
have failed, defines the extent of the primary duties imposed by the
law."69 Examination of the tort writs showed Holmes that in the
case of certain civil wrongs, such as allowing dammed water or wild
animals to escape, liability was found regardless of the culpability of
the actor; that in others, such as assault or fraud, culpability was a
prerequisite for liability; and that in still others the culpability of
the defendant, although pivotal to recovery, was determined not from
"facts" but "from motives of policy ... kept purposely indefinite."'7
This last category of cases constituted "modem negligence." 71 Thus
Torts could be subdivided into three categories: absolute liability,
intentional torts, and negligence. 2
Holmes's theory was not remarkable in itself; common law writs
had, as noted, acquired roughly similar classifications through their
procedural requirements. The significant contribution Holmes made
was the isolation, in academic literature, of negligence as a substantive
tort doctrine. This contribution was significant in two respects. First,
it articulated in authoritative terms an expansion in American case
law of the concept of negligence from a specific, predetermined duty
to a general standard of care. Second, Holmes's isolation of "modem
negligence" provided Torts with a philosophical principle 73 (no lia-
bility for tortious conduct absent fault; fault to be determined by
reference to "the felt necessities of the times" 74) that, in a short
the late 19th century, there is doubtless some significance to the fact that conceptualism
in academic law emerged at the same time that law schools began to hire professors on
a full-time basis. See Stevens, supra note 7, at 424-41. With law designated a "science"
and academics urged to develop scientific methodologies, it was perhaps inevitable that
an ordering of intellectual fields would take place, if for no other reason than a grand
synthesis of Torts or Contracts provided a means of making one's professional mark.
68. [Holmes], The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. REv. 652, 660 (1873). Mark DeWolfe
Howe attributes this essay to Holmes. M. HowE, supra note 40, at 64.
69. [Holmes], supra note 68, at 659-60.
70. Id. at 659.
71. Id. at 653.
72. The efforts of Holmes and his contemporaries to develop a general theory of
Torts mark one instance in which an American development in 19th-century legal
scholarship preceded an analogous development in England. The first English treatise
to attempt a generalized treatment of Torts, Frederick Pollock's The Law of Torts, did
not appear until 1887. It was dedicated to Holmes.
73. See [Holmes], supra note 68, at 660.
74. The phrase is Holmes's. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMsuON LAw 1 (1881).
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space of time, came to dominate tort law. So infatuated was Holmes
with his discovery of "the great mass of cases" in which a negligence
standard was applied, and so convinced was he of the soundness of
conditioning tort liability on a policy determination that a standard
of care had been violated, that only eight years after his first theory
of Torts he was prepared to argue that absolute liability had never
truly existed in tort law, and that fault, either in the strict (inten-
tional) or looser (negligent) sense, had always been a prerequisite
for liability.75
Holmes's conception of negligence as a general standard of conduct
and, parenthetically, as a distinguishing principle for tort law, was
one toward which certain American courts had previously been grop-
ing. Prior to the 1830s, with the exception of a handful of cases in
New York,70 the term "negligence" generally referred to "neglect" or
failure to perform a specific duty imposed by contract, statute, or
common law. Examples were the duty of a sheriff to maintain pris-
oners in custody77 and the duty of a town to keep bridges in good
condition.78 Suits arising out of the escape of prisoners or damage
to bridges or roads alleged that the official responsible had been neg-
ligent or neglectful. Commentators used negligence in a similar
fashion.70 There is little indication that prior to the 1830s negligence
was generally equated with carelessness or fault. A neglectful per-
son could be found liable simply for nonfeasance.80
During the 1830s certain state courts, among them New York, Massa-
chusetts, and Pennsylvania, increasingly came to associate negligence
with violations of a general standard of care that was not limited to
specific persons, offices, or occupations. Brown v. Kendall,8' a Massa-
chusetts case in which a dog owner inadvertently injured a bystander
while attempting to break up a dog fight, is regularly cited as the
first American case clearly to employ a "fault" standard in Torts.8 2
It was preceded, however, by at least three other cases in New York
75. Id. at 89. Holmes acknowledged that fault might not have been a prerequisite "in
that period of dry precedent which is so often to be found midway between a creative
epoch and a period of solvent philosophical reaction." Id.
76. E.g., Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1820); Foot v. Wiswall, 14 Johns.
304 (N.Y. 1817). See M. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 85-97.
77. E.g., Fatten v. Halsted, I N.J.L. 277 (1795).
78. E.g., Lobdell v. New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153 (1804).
79. See, e.g., 3 N. DANE, supra note 14, at 31-33.
80. See, e.g., Patten v. Halsted, 1 N.J.L. 277 (1795). See also M. HoRwITz, supra note
5, at 86.
81. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
82. See, e.g., Al. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIvES 30 (1971); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON TORTS 9 (6th cd. 1976).
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and Pennsylvania. s3 Brown v. Kendall's significance lay in the im-
pressive articulation of a generalized "fault" standard by Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw, a judge who by the 1850s had come to view the common
law as a set of broad and comprehensive principles.84 Shaw did not
originate the association of the term "negligence" with violations of
a general standard of care in Brown v. Kendall,s but suggested that
the fault principle had wide application. Negligence, Shaw implied,
was more than a neglect of specific duties imposed only under cer-
tain circumstances; it was the touchstone (and principal limiting
factor) of a general theory of civil obligation, under which persons
owed a universal, but confined, duty to take care not to injure their
neighbors.86
Viewed in this fashion, the modern negligence principle in tort
law seems to have been an intellectual response to the increased num-
ber of accidents involving persons in no preexisting relationships with
each other-"stranger" cases."- In this limited sense the conventional
identification of the rise of Torts with the advent of industrialism
is accurate. Advances in transportation and industry-mills, dams,
carriages, ships-made injuries involving strangers more common. As
judges and legal scholars sought to establish a theory of liability for
stranger accidents, older notions of neglect proved inadequate, for
increasingly parties involved in accidents owed no previously im-
posed duties to one another. The special requirements of individual
writs may have served to distinguish one tortious injury from another,
but they did not address the principal policy question raised by
stranger accident cases: As a matter of policy, what general duties
were owed to all by all?88 Once the import of this question became
clear, the ground for a new theory of tort liability in stranger cases
was broken. Neglect was widened to become a generalized theory of
legal carelessness; an objective fault standard emerged as a limiting
principle of tort liability; modern negligence was born.
Two stranger cases from the 1870s, one of which made use of
83. Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow. 175 (N.Y. 1828); Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92
(N.Y. 1819); Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 4 Rawle 8 (Pa. 1833).
Livingston v. Adams and Lehigh Bridge were "bursting dam" cases, and Panton v.
Holland a case in which a foundation for a house had been dug improperly.
84. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 67 Mass. (I Gray) 263, 267 (1854). See
G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 60-61 (1976).
85. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 90 (maintaining that "an exaggerated signif-
icance" has been assigned to Brown v. Kendall).
86. See 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296.
87. M. HORWITZ, supra note 5, uses similar terminology. Professor Horwitz sees mid-
19th-century judges as "develop[ing] the idea of duties owed to noncontracting strangers."
Id. at 95.
88. See [Holmes], supra note 68, at 663.
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Holmes's insights, illustrate the increasing dominance of the newer
generalized conception of negligence. Both cases, Brown v. Collins89
and Losee v. Buchanan,9" were reactions against the implications of
Rylands v. Fletcher,91 the 1868 House of Lords decision holding a de-
fendant liable regardless of fault for allowing water to seep through
his land and damage the mines of a neighbor. Both the Brown and
Losee courts concluded that strict liability for injuries to strangers was
not to be retained in modern American tort law. In Brown a pair of
horses, startled by the engine of a passing train, had shied off the
road and damaged a lamppost on an adjoining property owner's lot.
The parties stipulated that the driver "was in the use of ordinary
care and skill" in managing his horses prior to the time they became
frightened. Judge Charles Doe held that, absent a showing of "actual
fault" in the driver, no liability would attach.92 Relying in part on
Holmes's observations in The Theory of Torts,93 Doe maintained that
to extend the Rylands v. Fletcher principle of "absolute liability with-
out evidence of negligence," seemed "contrary to the analogies and
the general principles of the common law."94 Holding a defendant
liable without a showing that he had acted negligently was the equiva-
lent of suggesting that "every one is liable for all damage done by
superior force overpowering him, and using him or his property as
an instrument of violence."95 Doe argued that liability in tort, where
a defendant had acted unintentionally, should be conditioned on a
showing of lack of "ordinary care and skill." 96
One of the precedents Doe relied upon in Brown v. Collins was
Losee v. Buchanan, a New York case also decided in 1873. In the ab-
sence of any New Hampshire precedent for applying negligence in
the generalized sense employed in Brown, Doe had looked to other
courts and scholars for support for his critique of Rylands v. Fletcher.
But in Losee Commissioner Robert Earl had the benefit of a prior
New York case,97 which he cited as holding that "'[w]here one builds
a mill-dam upon a proper model, and the work is well and substan-
tially done, he is not liable to an action though it break away ....
Negligence should be shown in order to make him liable.' "98 Earl's
89. 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
90. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
91. 3 L.R. 1 E. & L App. 330 (1868).
92. 53 N.H. at 450-51.
93. Id. at 445.
94. Id. at 450.
95. Id. at 451.
96. Id. at 442.
97. Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow. 175 (N.Y. 1828).
98. 51 N.Y. at 487.
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task was to extend that principle to a case in which a steam boiler
had exploded, damaging buildings on a neighboring tract of land.
He thought the extension simple enough. "We must have factories,
machinery, dams, canals and railroads," he maintained. "If I have any
of these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not so
managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any damage
they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He receives his
compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he
shares . .. .9
As for Rylands v. Fletcher, Judge Earl found it to be "in direct
conflict with the law as settled in this country."' 00 The "universal"
American rule, Earl asserted, was that "no one can be made liable
for injuries to the person or property of another without some fault
or negligence on his part." 101 Negligence was thus much more than
a specific duty. It was a general precondition of liability for uninten-
tional torts-a "universal rule" that helped define the subject of Torts
itself. As Holmes wrote eight years later in The Common Law: "The
general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where
it falls . . . . 'No case or principle can be found . . . subjecting an
individual to liability for an act done without fault on his part.' ,"10
With the growth of negligence from a specific unperformed duty
owed to a particular person to a generalized standard of care owed
to all, the emergence of Torts as an independent branch of law was
ensured. Impulses to conceptualize law around a series of universal
principles had extracted Torts from a diverse series of writs and trans-
formed it into a discernible academic subject; these same impulses
were struggling to find some unity in the various civil wrongs that
were being cataloged. Negligence provided that unity; it also provided
a workable standard-a limiting principle-for the numerous inad-
vertent injuries involving strangers that had come to be a character-
istic late 19th-century tort action. Negligence can thus be identified
with all of the trends that combined to produce the emergence of
the subject of Torts in America. Negligence was a universal rule,
satisfying conceptualist tendencies in legal thought; it was an all-pur-
pose cause of action, supplanting both trespass and case; and it was
an evaluative standard for decisionmaking in cases involving unin-
tentional injuries to strangers.
99. Id. at 484-85.
100. Id. at 486-87.
101. Id. at 491.
102. 0. HOLMES, supra note 74, at 94-95 (quoting Chief Justice Nelson of New York).
Holmes cited Brown v. Kendall with approval at 105-06.
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The close identification of Torts with the rise of negligence can
be seen in the evolution of Torts casebooks and treatises by legal
scholars in the late 19th century. As late as the third edition of
Hilliard's treatise in 1866, negligence had only a nine-page treatment,
and most of the cases cited used the term in its earlier sense of failure
to perform a specific duty. 0 3 Ames's 1874 casebook, as indicated, con-
tained no negligence cases. 04 By 1880, in Thomas Cooley's treatise,1°5
the need for a generalized treatment of negligence had begun to be
perceived. Cooley devoted a chapter to "Wrongs from Non-Perfor-
mance of Conventional and Statutory Duties," and included negligence
among them.1 6 But he also recognized that "in every relation of life
some duty is imposed for the benefit of others,"' 0 7 and in a
separate chapter discussed "the general principles which must govern
when . . . one has been injured by the neglect of another to observe
due care."'0 8 His discussion included reference to a great many
stranger accident cases.' 00 In 1893 Ames's casebook was supplemented
by a second volume, authored by Jeremiah Smith, that devoted six
chapters to negligence, including discussions of standards of care, the
concept of a duty, and contributory negligence."'0 Smith retained a
chapter on negligence as a duty imposed by contract; but that chapter
was omitted in the 1909 edition."' By 1911 John H. Wigmore ap-
parently believed that Torts was sufficiently discrete to merit a full-
blown conceptualist treatment. He divided the "Science of Law" into
"public" and "private" components," 2 and each component into
"groups" and their "topic[s],' u113 and proceeded to analyze the legal
relations this categorization created.114 He found Torts to be con-
cerned with universal, "non-refusable" duties, which created correla-
tive "general rights."" He then subdivided "general rights" into
three elements-damage, causation, and excuse"16-and further sub-
divided these elements"17 in a virtual mania of classification. His tech-
103. See I F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS 115-23 (3d ed. Boston 1866).
104. See p. 683 supra.
105. T. CoOLEY, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1880).
106. Id. at 628-58.
107. Id. at 659.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 661-66 (citing cases).
110. 2 J. Ahms & J. SMITH, A SELEcTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (J. Smith ed.
1893).
111. Id. at iii (J. Smith ed. 1909).
112. 1 J. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF ToRrs, app. B, at vii, x (1911).
113. Id. at xi.
114. Id. at x.
115. Id. at x, xi.
116. Id. at xi.
117. Id. at xi-1.
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nique was made possible, Wigmore felt, because Torts, being a branch
of law, had "the quality of being uniform and regular."' "
Behind Wigmore's nomenclature was the triumph of an insight of
Holmes's in the 1870s: Torts was that part of the law concerned with
universal private duties "of all to all."'"19 It was, in short, virtually
synonymous with negligence. Intentional torts were clear violations
of duties "of all the world to all the world";12 0 they raised few policy
questions and primarily involved only problems of causation and
assessment of damages. Inadvertent, nonnegligent torts were not ac-
tionable unless a given duty had been imposed on the nonnegligent
actor by statute, custom, or practice. Negligence cases most starkly
raised the policy issue that Holmes and his followers found most sig-
nificant: When does society impose a duty not to harm one's neigh-
bor? Thus Torts, by the close of the 19th century, had been trans-
formed from its former status as a handful of civil, noncontractual
wrongs, some of which (assault and battery) were retained in the
new conceptualization of the late 19th century, others of which (ne-
glect) were cast aside in the treatises and in the courts. Torts had
become an entity distinct from the other private-law categories of
Contracts or Property: it was that branch of private law which dealt
with universally imposed duties.
IV. The 19th-Century Legacy
The climate of opinion in which Torts emerged as an independent
branch of the law has had significant effects on its subsequent devel-
opment. Tracing those effects is beyond the scope of this article, but
there is one general legacy of the formative period of Torts worth
noting here. The scientific methodologies of Green and Holmes,
as well as those of conceptualists in other fields, regularly succeeded
in deriving social theories that were "evolutionary" in character, that
is, theories that built their intellectual systems on the assumptions
that life was constantly changing and man continually adapting to
change. Looking back on his intellectual experiences in the 1860s
and 1870s, Holmes observed that evolutionary theories had affected
"our whole way of thinking about the universe." 12' One of the para-
doxes of the conceptualism of this period was that although it tended
to derive monistic theories, those theories rested on a sense of fluidity:
118. Id. at vii.
119. The phrase is Holmes's in The Theory of Torts, supra note 68, at 662.
120. Id. at 660.
121. 1 HoLMES-POLLOCK Lmrraas 57-58 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
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the evolutionary "laws" of the universe were everywhere true but were
based on the permanency of change. In both Green's and Holmes's
Writing in the post-Civil War years one can see a dual concern for
achieving order and unity and for recognizing that "all things in na-
ture . . . shade into each other by imperceptible degrees.' '1 22 Against
a scientifically derived philosophical synthesis was juxtaposed "the
felt necessities of the times." 123
Historians have noted the two-pronged character of these evolu-
tionary theories: they led, in the early 20th century, either to a de-
terministic view of society, in which the fittest invariably survived,
or to a pragmatic view, in which man continually adapted himself
to changing conditions.124 One can see traces of this same duality in
early 20th-century scholarly approaches to tort law. Even though a
conceptualist methodology persisted among some torts scholars as late
as 1920,125 other torts scholars soon disassociated themselves from
conceptualism in its most monistic forms. Shortly after the triumph
of negligence as a unifying principle of Torts, scholars suggested
that the negligence principle had little meaning outside the changing
circumstances in which it was to be applied.'
2 0
When this critique of conceptualism in Torts, often identified with
realism in American jurisprudence, 27 is reexamined in light of the
intellectual origins of Torts, an additional observation suggests itself.
It is conceivable that the evolutionary character of negligence theory
may have itself contributed to the dissatisfaction with universal rules
in Torts. The dynamic component of evolutionary theories was the
component most attractive to early 20th-century intellectuals. Rapid
change came to be seen as a permanent feature of American civiliza-
tion, and legal scholars, as well as other intellectuals, criticized uni-
versal rules as mechanical and static. ' 28 The major late-I9th-century
rule of Torts, the negligence principle, had an inherent capacity to
adapt itself to change, since its operative standard, "ordinary care
under the circumstances," presumed that no one set of circumstances
122. N. GREEN, supra note 34, at 166. See Frank, supra note 28, at 436-37.
123. 0. HoL Es, supra note 74, at 660.
124. See, e.g., E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY (1952).
125. See, e.g., Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633, 636
(1920).
126. See, e.g., L. GREEN, Analysis of Tort Cases, in JUDGE AND JURY 21 (1930); L.
GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES iii (1931). (Both of Green's books contain
other examples of his critique of the negligence principle.)
127. In his celebrated article, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222,
1226 n.18 (1931), Karl Llewellyn identified Leon Green as one of the advocates of
"realistic" jurisprudence.
128. See White, From Sociological jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and So-
cial Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1003-05 (1972).
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was precisely like another. But the negligence principle was also in-
tended to be monistic, in the sense of being capable of universal ap-
plication in a predictable manner. As suspicion of monistic prin-
ciples mounted in the early 20th century, the fluid character of neg-
ligence was stressed. 12 9 It was a short step from perceiving the negli-
gence principle as fluid to perceiving it as meaningless outside the
circumstances in which it was applied.
Conclusion: The Role of Dominant Methodologies
in American Legal History
This article has attempted to stress the importance of the values
and thought patterns of 19th-century American intellectuals in fos-
tering the growth of Torts as an independent branch of law. I have
resisted a linear explanation for what "caused" the emergence of Torts,
suggesting that the growth of industrialization is only part of the
explanation. A fuller understanding of the origins of Torts as a
separate branch of law requires, I have maintained, an appreciation
of the changes in American intellectual culture that took place after
1850.
By my focus on scholars and academicians within the legal profes-
sion, I do not mean to suggest that the role of those groups in shaping
the content of law is more significant than that of practitioners,
judges, or other persons with legal training. I do mean to suggest,
however, that it is more significant than perhaps commonly supposed;
that treatise writers and scholars do not merely collect data supplied
by courts and practitioners, but organize it in accordance with their
existing intellectual inclinations. The raw material for a theory that
would distinguish Torts from other areas of law was present in mid-
19th-century America. The significance of a classification of Torts
as a discrete branch of law was accentuated by the collapse of the writ
system, a collapse that was not brought about by scholars. But the
methodological apparatus that ultimately derived the modern neg-
ligence principle was created by intellectuals. The independence of
Torts was ultimately linked to the triumph, in Victorian America,
of a conceptualist methodology.
The significance of dominant disciplinary or professional method-
ologies,130 and the value choices or assumptions those methodologies
129. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161 (1921); B. CAR-
DOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 85 (1928).-
130. The phrase "dominant methodology" can be analogized to "paradigm" or "dis-
ciplinary matrix" as used by Thomas Kuhn. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
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tacitly make, seems to me to represent a theme in the history of Amer-
ican law that has received inadequate treatment. Current scholarship
in American legal history makes the now-commonplace assumption
that law "mirrors"''1 1 society and that factors "external"'132 to the
workings of legal institutions have had an important influence on
the course of American law. While this assumption is not unsound,
it tends to underemphasize the role of dominant thought patterns
within the legal profession that form the intellectual context in which
"external" developments take place. We need to know much more
about the origins of these patterns of thought, whose primary function
seems to be that of shaping and limiting the interpretation of the
changing source materials of the legal profession.
My interest here has been in identifying some of the cultural forces
that served to focus the theoretical concerns of American intellectuals,
including legal scholars, during the period when Torts emerged as
an independent branch of law. My analytical model has been one
that seeks to identify the features of American culture that, during
given periods, shape the intellectual inquiries of scholars in academic
disciplines or professions into tacitly approved pursuits, reflecting the
acknowledged primacy of certain values, such as order, unity, crea-
tivity, or independence, and creating certain methodological orienta-
tions, such as conceptualism.
The relationship between ideas and events in American legal history
is probably more complex than some current scholarship implies. The
fields into which law is classified, the subjects taught in American law
schools, the treatise literature, and the doctrinal bases of case law are
not merely reflections of current events; to an important extent they
are the end products of intellectual trends within the legal profession.
These trends themselves develop from complicated interactions of
events and ideas which legal historians have not studied in any detail.
Examining the dominant methodological assumptions of academicians
and other scholars in the legal profession is, in my view, a potentially
fruitful way to address the relationship among ideas, events, and the
history of American law. This article is intended, therefore, as an
initial exploration of a broad and complex subject.
REVOLUTIONS 175, 182 (2d ed. 1970). Kuhn defines "paradigm," in the sense most akin
to my focus here, as "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, Land] techniques . . .
shared by the members of a given community." Id. at 175.
131. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 10.
132. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Soc. REV. 9 (1975).
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